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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
jurisdictions, the position taken 'by the court of appeals in the principal
case has been the practice in Ohio for many years. The plea of former
jeopardy is unavailable on the second trial because the accused himself
has removed the bar which was effective to prevent his further trial for
the offense of first-degree murder.
It is axiomatic that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a
substitute for the criminal appeal. Several appellate decisions reinforce
that rule of practice. Generally, the writ may not be used as a method of
presenting alleged errors in an indictment.° 9 The rule is doubly true
when the accused has pleaded guilty to the indictment claimed to be de-
fective. 100 By pleading guilty to the indictment, the correctness of the
factual charges contained in the indictment are admitted. The writ is
equally unavailing where the errors claimed occur in trial proceedings,
such as inefficient counsel and defects in the service of papers.' 0 When
the court has jurisdiction to pronounce sentence, the remedy, if any, is -by
appeal, not through the writ of habeas corpus. 02
MAURICE S. CULP
DAMAGES
In Maus v. New York, C. & S. L. R. R. Co.' the Supreme Court con-
sidered two problems which are troubling trial counsel in this day of
rapidly changing dollar value. First, the court approved an instruction
to the jury, in a personal injury suit involving loss of future earnings, that
the jury "in considering the loss of future earnings, the earning power of
money should be taken into account."2 Second, the court affirmed a re-
fusal by the trial court to grant an instruction requested by the defendant
that "any amount received by the .plaintiff as compensation for personal
injuries is exempt from personal income taxation and you must take this
fact in consideration. " (Emphasis added) 3 The court said that "there
is no reason why the charge requested by the defendant should have been
given, since the effect would be to give the jury license to disregard the
charge on the measure of damages already given."4  On this type of in-
struction one other state supreme court, Illinois,5 has held it improper
while one Missouri Court0 has held it proper. Several federal trial and
appellate courts have held such instructions improper on the basis that
'In re Giordano, 164 Ohio St. 509, 132 N.E.2d 211 (1956), cert. dented, 351 U.S.
958 (1956).
'Frisco v. Alvis, 136 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio App. 1955).
01McConnaughy v. Alvis, 165 Ohio St. 102, 133 N.E.2d 133 (1956)
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they introduced too conjectural an element. It should be noted that in
the present decision there are two caveats: First, the court does not pass
on the "question as to what a trial judge's response should be if and when
the jury asks him whether it should consider the matter of income tax. '7
Second, Judge Bell in a concurring opinion says:
We believe the requested charge is erroneous in that it requires the
jury to take this subject into consideration. An award of damages
on account of personal injuries is not to be included in gross income. As
long as this remains the law, it would not be improper for a trial court
to say so in response to a jury s inquiry or to give a special instruction
when properly prepared in conformance with this federal law.!
In Haase v. Ryan,9 a suit by a seven year old child to recover for negli-
gently inflicted personal injuries, a court of appeals held that since perma-
nent injury was alleged it was proper to admit the American Experience
Tables disclosing the life expectancy of the child. Although the court
held that such tables are not conclusive and the jury should have been
so instructed, "the failure of the court in the instant case to so instruct the
jury was an error of omission and was not prejudicial. Members of a
jury are well aware of the vicissitudes and uncertainties of life."iO
Although it seems to be a well settled principle that the amount of
recovery from a person who is responsible for a personal injury is not to
be affected by the receipt by the plaintiff from his employer of wages or
salary for the period during which the plaintiff has suffered from the in-
jury, there has been doubt as to whether the decided cases placed Ohio
in conformity with this general principle. It is suggested, however, that
this doubt is not widely shared by lawyers and judges on the battlements
of trial work. Rigney v. Cincsnnatt Street Ry.11 dealt with this matter.
In that case the plaintiff was a civil service employee of the United States
government and at the time of injury had to her credit a sufficient num-
ber of annual leave and sick leave days, so that her employer continued
her on full pay during the time of injury. The court held that the wrong-
1165 Ohio St 281, 135 N.E.2d 253 (1956).
1d. at 285, 135 N.E.2d at 256.
11d. at 282, 135 N.E.2d at 254.
'Id. at 285, 135 N.E.2d at 256.
SHall v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 5 IIl. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
8Dempsey v. Thompson, 33 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
Maus v. New York, C. & S.L. R.R. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 285, 135 N.E.2d 253, 256
(1956)
'Ibid.
'100 Ohio App. 285, 136 N.X.2d 406 (1955).
"Old. at 291, 136 N.E.2d at 410.
- 99 Ohio App. 105, 131 N.E.2d 413 (1954).
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